A Comment on "The Nuclear Issue in the South Pacific" by Firth, Stewart
For fifty years, from 1946 to the last French test in 1996, nuclear bombs
exploded in pristine Pacific environments, in the atmosphere, underwater,
and even in space, leaving behind radioactive contamination of islands,
reefs, and sea, and stimulating powerful anti-nuclear sentiment in the
region. Observers of the South Pacific scene should be pleased to have a
French perspective on the history of this issue. 
As Regnault rightly points out, France’s decision to begin nuclear test-
ing in the Pacific in the 1960s could only be met by a hostile reaction. After
all, the threat of nuclear contamination from atmospheric testing and fall-
out had been recognized by the nuclear powers of the time, so much so
that the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom agreed
not to test in the atmosphere, underwater, or in space as early as 1963,
leaving underground as the sole environment where testing was permitted.
Yet Paris was to begin testing three years later in the very environment
now considered too dangerous for human populations by Washington,
Moscow, and London—the atmosphere. And that atmosphere, in terms of
local fallout, was in the South Pacific. In terms of global fallout, it was in
the Southern Hemisphere, and protests were indeed to come from South
American as well as South Pacific countries. 
The people of the South Pacific wanted to know why, if French testing
was as safe as France claimed, it could not be conducted in mainland
France rather than in French territories, as far away from Europe as pos-
sible. No satisfactory answer to that question ever came: If there were to
be risks to human populations, the French authorities wanted those pop-
ulations to be small, far away, and unable to mount effective political
opposition. That is why anti-nuclear activists in the South Pacific saw the
problem as colonial, a word that Regnault places in quotation marks as if
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to indicate its inappropriateness. Yet who can doubt that an independent
French Polynesia, a Maohi state, would have refused to allow its islands
to be used for nuclear experimentation? The great advantage of French
Polynesia as a location for nuclear testing was precisely its complete polit-
ical subordination to the French state, and the futility, therefore, of anti-
nuclear protests of the kind that occurred in Tahiti in 1973, 1989, and
1995.
On the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (spnfz) Treaty, Regnault cor-
rectly points to the political advantages of anti-nuclearism for the Labour
prime ministers of Australia and New Zealand. Both Bob Hawke and
David Lange were dismantling regulated economies in ways that alienated
their traditional working-class supporters, and they needed a radical for-
eign policy issue to enhance their left-wing credentials. And it is true, too,
that the treaty was particularly designed to oppose French testing while
sidestepping the issue of US nuclear-related activities in the South Pacific.
The Australian authorities showed little concern, as Regnault says, for
the Aboriginal peoples whose traditional country and walking tracks lay
in the test zones in Western Australia and South Australia. Here the colo-
nial connection was more one of mindset than legal status. Australia’s
prime minister in the 1950s, Sir Robert Menzies, was proud to describe
himself as “British to the bootheels” and to regard the British request to
test nuclear weapons on the Australian continent as an honor bestowed
on the Australian people. By the time another Australian government had
conducted a Royal Commission of Inquiry into British testing decades
later, the public mood had shifted considerably toward anti-nuclearism
and Australian national independence. As for the United States, its tests
created the greatest documented damage to the environment and to peo-
ple in the whole history of nuclear testing in the Pacific.
On just this issue of documentation, however, Regnault has little to say.
Why do we know so much about the deleterious effects of the fallout from
the US Bravo test on 1 March 1954, or the secret trials conducted by the
British with conventional explosives and nuclear materials in Australia in
the early 1960s? The answer is that in both cases, admittedly after years
of secrecy and cover-up, the authorities have been required to release pre-
viously classified information. Lawyers were taking up the case of the
Enewetak people, and the possible reuse of their atoll for further military
experiments, in the early 1970s, and the whole issue of compensation for
the affected populations of the Marshall Islands became part of the com-
pact negotiations between the United States and its former territory both
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in the 1980s and more recently for the renewed compact of free associa-
tion. The US Defense Nuclear Agency published an entire series of reports
on the tests in the Marshalls, and the full extent of radioactive injuries to
the exposed Marshallese has been on the public record for many years. In
the British case, the inquiry by the Royal Commission produced similarly
detailed information about both the impact of nuclear tests on the Abo-
riginal populations of desert Australia and more broadly the environmen-
tal impact on the entire continent. US and UK testing can be justly con-
demned in the light of what we know happened. 
In France’s case such information is almost entirely missing, and we are
left with official assurances, repeated ad nauseam throughout thirty years
of nuclear detonations, that French testing was conducted with such
efficiency that serious accidents did not happen. France admitted to a few
problems after François Mitterrand became president in 1981, such as the
sweeping of plutonium-impregnated tar into the sea during a cyclone at
Moruroa. France never conceded that its atmospheric testing contami-
nated islands downwind, even though the authorities constructed fallout
shelters at Mangareva and elsewhere, and even though New Zealand
monitoring stations detected fallout throughout the South Pacific during
the “blowback events” when winds blew fallout to the west rather than to
the east. “No matter how many reports are published demonstrating the
absence of any leaks or pollution,” Regnault says in endnote 31, “they will
not shake the certainties widely shared by the South Pacific peoples. Cold
reasoning and Cartesian logic have no hold over emotional positions.” Yet
the French state has conducted no equivalent of the open inquiries under-
taken by the United States and Australia, nor is there any French equiva-
lent of the freedom of information that now applies to the history of US
nuclear testing, freedom that was expanded under the Clinton adminis-
tration. Under these circumstances, “emotional positions” on the dangers
of testing seem entirely reasonable and doubts about official assurances
justified. 
Finally, a question of tone. This rather detached analysis fails to convey
the extent to which the nuclear issue in the South Pacific engaged a whole
generation of activists and political leaders from the early 1970s on. From
atom (Against Tests on Moruroa) came the movement for a Nuclear-Free
and Independent Pacific, which brought together the activists, trade union-
ists, and church members mentioned by Regnault. The achievement of
that movement over a long period was to legitimize the idea of a nuclear-
free Pacific, so that independent governments of the region had no alter-
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native but to endorse it. The idea of a nuclear-free Pacific became part of
the identity of the non-French Pacific, expressed in annual resolutions of
the South Pacific Forum as more and more colonies gained independence.
So strong was Pacific feeling in the early 1980s that a number of coun-
tries began to declare themselves nuclear free, and Australia—concerned
that the anti-nuclearism being provoked by French testing would eventu-
ally endanger US strategic interests—intervened to direct and contain
nuclear-free sentiment in ways that would protect the US position. When
France resumed testing in 1995, the outburst of popular protest in Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands, including French Polynesia,
was on an unprecedented scale. A simple but powerful idea had become
the property of ordinary people throughout the region. 
